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Abstract
Many information-ﬂow type systems have been developed that allow to control the non-interference of
information between the levels of classiﬁcation in the Bell-LaPadula model. We present here a translation
of typing information collected for bytecode programs to a bytecode program logic. This translation uses
the syntax of a bytecode speciﬁcation language BML. A translation of this kind allows including the check
of the non-interference property in a single, uniﬁed veriﬁcation framework based on a program logic and
thus can be exploited within a foundational proof-carrying code infrastructure. It also provides a ﬂexible
basis for various declassiﬁcation strategies that may be useful in a particular code body.
Keywords: Java, bytecode, speciﬁcation, BML, non-interference
1 Introduction
The application of formal speciﬁcation methods at the level of the Java bytecode
has several advantages. (1) This allows to provide descriptions and verify properties
of programs written in the bytecode itself. (2) It allows to do a uniﬁed formalised
development for languages other than Java, but compiling to the Java bytecode.
In particular, it allows to conduct a uniﬁed formal veriﬁcation in projects with
several source code languages. (3) Proofs for bytecode programs may enable several
optimisations in JIT compilers. (4) As bytecode is the language which is actually
executed, it is possible to couple with programs their proof carrying-code (PCC)
certiﬁcates. (5) Since Java programs are distributed in their bytecode version, it is
possible for a software distributor to develop its own certiﬁcate to ensure a particular
property its clients are interested in. These reasons led to a proposal of a bytecode
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program logic [7] and, based on this foundation, a speciﬁcation language for the
bytecode—Bytecode Modeling Language (BML) [11]. The latter language is based
on the design-by-contract principles and is derived from a Java speciﬁcation language
called Java Modeling Language [18,19,20] which has wide tool support [10].
We consider here the non-interference property of bytecode programs. Many
type systems to guarantee the non-interference have been proposed for while pro-
grams (e.g. [16,17,21]) as well as for other formal languages (e.g. [14,15]). The
starting point of our work is the information-ﬂow type system for Java bytecode
[4,5] that guarantees the non-interference for sequential bytecode programs with ob-
jects, methods and exceptions. The main contribution of the current paper is a
translation of the type system into the bytecode program logic developed within the
MOBIUS project [7,12] such that the correctness of the typing is equivalent to the
veriﬁability of bytecode program logic formulae. Here, the soundness of the type
system guarantees the non-interference property of veriﬁable programs.
It is worth pointing out that the translation has a few desirable features. First
of all, once the translation is in place it is possible to use a toolset based on logical
methods rather than typed ones. This allows to incorporate the guarantees of the
type system into a foundational proof-carrying code (PCC, [2]) framework and use
the non-interference property together with other properties originally formulated
and expressed in the foundational fashion 4 . Moreover, the wide selection of JML
based veriﬁcation tools and methods [10] is a solid basis to aim for a platform of
foundational PCC certiﬁcates for Java bytecode. Another desirable feature of this
method is the fact that the resulting model of the non-interference is more ﬂexible
than the one based on typing. This is important whenever the non-interference prop-
erty must be weakened, for example when declassiﬁcation is needed (in particular
when the code encrypts conﬁdential data). The translation we provide is designed
so that it is relatively straightforward to adjust it to various declassiﬁcation needs.
The Hoare-like logic available in BML is in fact only ﬁrst order logic with very
weak inventory of relations which allow to compare heaps at diﬀerent points of
program. In particular, it is impossible to express there the agreement operator by
Amtoft et al [1]. Moreover, BML also does not contain any features of dynamic
or algorithmic logic so it is impossible to express the non-interference property by
relating the heaps after two diﬀerent program runs as in [6] or [13]. Therefore, we
decided to model the type system derivations in BML and base the safety of the
program on the type system soundness. Still another limitation of the approach
based on BML is that the self-composition [3] cannot be expressed here (although
it is available in MOBIUS logic).
The paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2, we ﬁx the notation and present
the basic notions which are used in the paper. Sect. 3 provides an exposition of
the translation of the type based system to the logic based one. This translation
is supplemented by a theorem that the resulting speciﬁcations guarantee the non-
4 The translation from this paper does not reduce the trusted logical base to the one of the foundational
PCC. To achieve that one has to link the resulting formulae with the non-interference property expressed
in the foundational logic e.g. the property expressed in [8] for while programs.
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interference property in Sect. 4. The formal development is concluded by a proof that
the non-interference property holds even when the bytecode program is extended
with other speciﬁcations. This is presented in Sect. 4.1. At last we present the ﬁnal
remarks in Sect. 5 where we sketch the way the declassiﬁcation can be introduced.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we ﬁx the notation used throughout the paper. We, generally, follow
the papers [4,12]. We also present informal description of some notions which are not
directly used in the translation, but are essential for understanding the principles of
the construction.
Basic notation We use the expression dom(f) to denote the domain of the
(partial) function f . Similarly, rng(f) is the image of f . We write f : A ⇀ B when
f is a partial function from A to B. The powerset of A is P (A). We write k to
denote a vector of values. The notation |k| expresses the length of the vector and
k(0), . . . ,k(|k|−1) are subsequent elements of the vector. The set of ﬁnite sequences
over a set A is A∗.
Java bytecode programs and speciﬁcations A Java bytecode program P is
a set of classes with one singled out method mainP . A class C is a set of ﬁelds and
methods. Each ﬁeld f has a name fn and a type ft. Similarly, a method m has a
name N(m), a signature Tm and a body Bm 5 . We assume that the method names
are unique within a single program (possibly due to the standard Java preﬁxing with
an object or class name). A method body is a sequence of bytecode instructions.
The instructions are indexed by program points. For each method m we distinguish
the set of all program points in the method PPm (we omit the subscript m when it
is clear from the context).
An annotated program Pˆ has additionally (among others) for each class C a list
GhostC of model and ghost ﬁelds (i.e. ﬁelds which can occur only in speciﬁcations),
and a method speciﬁcation table MC . The bytecode program logic we employ here
[7] makes use of the method speciﬁcation table MC(m) associated with each method
m. This table consists of:
• a method speciﬁcation Sm = (Rm, Tm,Φm) where Rm is the precondition of the
method m, Tm is the postcondition of the method, and Φm is the method invariant
which holds in each accessible state of the method;
• a local speciﬁcation table Gm which assigns to each label in the method body
Bm an additional assumption that may be used in the proof of the program
veriﬁcation clause associated with the label (this corresponds to the BML assume
annotations);
• a local annotation table Qm which assigns to labels in Bm further assertions (this
corresponds to the BML assert annotations);
• a local instruction table Insm which assigns to each label l in the method body
5 The separation of the identities for the method and its name serves to model the inheritance.
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Bm a sequence of bytecode instructions that operate on ghost variables which is
supposed to be executed before the instruction at the label l and the respective
speciﬁcation Qm(l) (this corresponds to the BML set annotations).
Security policy We use here the security policy framework from [5]. It is based
on assumption that the attacker can observe the input/output of methods only. This,
however, is extended to the values of ﬁelds and heaps as otherwise it is diﬃcult to
guarantee statically the non-interference property. We also assume that the attacker
is unable to observe the termination of the programs.
Formally, a security policy is expressed in terms of a ﬁnite partial order (S,≤).
This order allows to describe the capabilities of the attacker and the program to be
analysed:
• A security level kobs determines the observational capabilities of the attacker (she
can observe ﬁelds, local variables and return values the level of which is less or
equal than kobs).
• A policy function ft assigns to each ﬁeld its security level. This allows us to express
the non-interference property we are interested in.
• A policy function Γ that associates to each method identiﬁer N(m) and security
level k ∈ S a security signature ΓN(m)[k] 6 . This signature gives the security
policy of the method m called on an object of the level k. The set of security
signatures for a method m is deﬁned as PoliciesΓ(m) = {ΓN(m)[k] | k ∈ S}. The
security signature has the shape kp
kh→ kr:
· The vector kp describes the security levels appropriate for the local variables
of the method (in particular it assigns also the levels to the input parameters),
kp[0] is the upper bound on the security level of an object that calls the method.
· The value kh describes the lower bound in the security levels of the heap oper-
ations performed by the method.
· The vector kr describes the security levels for the method results (both normal
and exceptional ones); it is a list of the form {n : kn, e1 : ke1 , . . . , en : ken}, where
kn is the security level of the return value and ei is the class of an exception
that might be thrown in the method and kei is the upper bound on the security
level of the exception. We use the notation kr[n] and kr[ei] for kn and kei .
Non-interference The non-interference property is articulated by a safety deﬁ-
nition in [4,5]. Informally, a program is non-interferent if all its methods are safe;
a method is safe if two terminating runs of the method with inputs that cannot
be distinguished by an attacker, and equivalent heaps, yield results that cannot be
distinguished by the attacker and if the method cannot modify the heap in a way
that is observable by an attacker.
Non-structured programs The bytecode programs organise the control ﬂow
by means of jump instructions. In order to reason on the information ﬂow of such
programs an additional structural information is needed. As we translate typings
6 In [5] a less precise notation Γm[k] is used.
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in an information ﬂow system [5], we need the same descriptions of the bytecode
program structure.
We use a binary successor relation →τ⊆ PP×PP deﬁned on the program points.
This relation is parametrised by a tag τ since a instructions may have several succes-
sors as they may execute normally (the tag is ∅) or may trigger exceptions (the tag
is the class of the exception). Intuitively, j is a successor of i (i → j) if performing
one step execution from a state whose program point is i may lead to a state whose
program point is j. We write i → when → is undeﬁned for i i.e. if i corresponds
to a return instruction (or i →τ if i corresponds to an instruction that may throw
an exception that is not handled locally). Note that an instruction may have more
than one successor.
We assume that a bytecode program P comes equipped with a control dependence
regions structure cdr which consists of a pair of partial functions (region, jun). The
role of the functions is to arrange the program into compact parts for which the
analysis of program invariants can be conducted separately. The region function
describes the internal parts of these regions while jun the connections between them.
The types of the functions are the following:
regionm : PP × ({∅}+ C) → P (PP) junm : PP × ({∅}+ C) ⇀ PP
The functions can be axiomatised by the SOAP (Safe Over APproximation) prop-
erties [5, Sect. 4] ensuring that the control dependence regions structure correctly
describe information ﬂow in a program P .
Typable programs To check that a program is non-interferent one may use a
type system presented in [5]. In this type system, every method is checked against
its signatures separately. The type system is parametrised by:
• a table Γ of method signatures,
• a global policy ft that provides security levels of ﬁelds,
• a cdr structure (regionm, junm) for every method m.
We assume also that the functions below are given and that they are correct:
(i) classAnalysis which for a program point returns the set of exception classes of
exceptions that may be thrown at the program point.
(ii) excAnalysis which for a method name N(m) returns the set of exception classes
that are possibly thrown by m.
(iii) nbLocs which for a method name N(m) returns the number of its local variables.
(iv) nbArgs which for a method name N(m) returns the number of its arguments.
(v) Handlerm which for a given point i in the method m and an exception e returns
the point where the handler of the exception starts.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (typable programs and methods) Method m is typable with respect
to ft, Γ, regionm and a signature sgn if there exists a security environment se :
PP → S and a function st : PP → S∗ such that st(0) = ε and for all i, j ∈ PP ,
e ∈ {∅} ∪ C:
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Pm[i] = ifeq j ∀j′ ∈ region(i, ∅), k ≤ se(j′)
Γ, ft, region, se,kp
kh→ kr, i 
∅ k :: st =⇒ liftk(st)
Figure 1. The typing rule for ifeq
(1) if i →e j then there exists s ∈ S∗ such that Γ, ft, regionm, se, sgn, i 
e st(i) =⇒
s and s  st(j),
(2) if i →e then Γ, ft, regionm, se, sgn, i 
e st(i) =⇒
where  denotes the point-wise partial order on the type stack with respect to the
partial order taken on security levels. An example of a rule to derive . . . 
e . . . =⇒
. . ., for ifeq, is given in Figure 1 7 . The set of all typing rules is presented in [4].
A program P is typable with the policy (kobs, ft,Γ) and cdr satisfying SOAP if
every method m from P is typable with respect to ft, Γ, regionm and all signatures
in PoliciesΓ(m).
Intuitively, the function se gives for each program point i a security level k
such that the instruction at i cannot store to locations of a level lower than k; the
function st associates with each program point a stack of security levels such that
the operands on the actual stack cannot be at level higher than the one indicated
by st; at last sgn is the currently used security signature for the analysed method.
Let us analyse the rule on Figure 1. The assertion under the line assumes that
given are: a table of method signatures Γ, security levels of ﬁelds ft, a region
function, a security environment function se, a signature of the current method m
kp
kh→ kr and a program point i. It asserts safety for the cases when the normal
(non-exceptional) step is taken by the programme. A safe step, here, must transform
in the abstract world the stack h :: st to a stack liftk(st). This rule allows to assert
it provided that two requirements are fulﬁlled. The ﬁrst one Pm[i] = ifeq j requires
that the instruction at point i is ifeq. The second one, ∀j′ ∈ region(i, ∅), k ≤
se(j′), describes the requirement on the code executed after the branch. The level
k is the security level of the value read by ifeq. All program points in region(i)
are points executing under the guard of i. Since security environment se is meant
to be the upper bound of all the guards under which the program point execute, it
is natural that k ≤ se(j′) for all j′ ∈ region(i). The stack on the right-hand side
of =⇒ is lifted; liftk is the point-wise extension to stack types of λl.k unionsq l. The
lifting operation prevents illicit ﬂows through the operand stack; the stack shows
what happened before, for example what was the value at ifeq, and lifting prevents
leaking of this information.
Note that st and se are chosen for particular signature sgn. This signature, in
turn, comes from PoliciesΓ(m) and for each security level s ∈ S we have a single
signature. In this light we may consider se and st as collections indexed by elements
of S only.
The main theorem of [5] states that typable programs are non-interferent.
7 We limit our exposition to the ifeq instruction due to the space restrictions.
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3 Translation from the information ﬂow system
In order to express in the bytecode program logic that there is no unwanted infor-
mation ﬂow in the program P we need to add some formula annotations to P and
to extend the method speciﬁcation tables for P with the formulae which encode
the conditions from Def. 2.1. Both can be done separately for each method. The
translation we present here uses extensively BML and in particular ghost ﬁelds of
the formalism.
3.1 Summary of BML
The translation of the information ﬂow system into the bytecode program logic is
done with the use of the BML syntax. The BML formulae can be translated to the
actual bytecode program logic with the use of the translation in [12]. Here is a brief
summary of the relevant BML syntax.
We use the modiﬁer ghost to indicate that a particular variable is not a pro-
gram variable, but a speciﬁcation variable. Other Java type modiﬁers such as
public,private,ﬁnal, static have the same meaning as in the case of Java dec-
larations. We use the BML syntax to denote the logical connectives i.e. && means
the logical conjunction, || the logical alternative, and ! the logical negation. The
logical implication is denoted as ==>. We also use the BML syntax to access and
initialise elements of arrays and to denote types of variables. We also use here the
general quantiﬁer. The syntax of the quantiﬁer expression is as follows:
(\forall variable declaration; bound on the quantiﬁcation; actual formula)
where the variable declaration has the same form as a variable declaration in Java
and introduces the quantiﬁed variables. The bound on the quantiﬁcation is a formula
the goal of which is to restrict potentially inﬁnite domain of the quantiﬁcation to
be ﬁnite and it can be any boolean expression. At last, the actual formula is the
formula we are interested in. A bound on the quantiﬁcation B and an actual formula
A are understood as the implication B ==> A.
3.2 Data to translate
The annotations we need are of two kinds. First of all, a reliable description of the
security requirements and the program structure must be provided at the side of
BML i.e. the security levels of ﬁelds, method signatures, cdr structure etc. must
be represented in the form of ghost variables. Therefore, the ﬁrst group of the
translated data consists of:
• a table Γ of method signatures,
• a global policy ft that provides security levels of ﬁelds,
• a cdr structure (regionm, junm) 8 ,
8 We actually do not provide the deﬁnition for junm as the function does not occur in the typing rules
in [4].
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• functions classAnalysis, excAnalysis, nbLocs, nbArgs, Handler.
The idea of our translation is that we check by means of the BML formulae
that a derivation in the information-ﬂow type system is correct. Therefore, we must
translate the data on which the type system operates. To this end we need to
transform the functions mentioned in Def. 2.1 i.e. for each policy signature of a
method: a security environment se : PP → S, and a function st : PP → S∗.
Additionally, we use certain static data which is not deﬁned explicitly in terms
of ghost variables, but is inlined in the deﬁnitions below. The values of this kind
are:
• maxEx the number of all exception types in P .
• maxS the maximal security level used to type-check P ; the level 0 ∈ S will be
used to mark the undeﬁned value. Let S0 = S ∪ {0}.
• maxNbArg the maximal number of arguments of all methods in P .
• lm the maximal label of the method m.
• maxStack the maximal height of the stack in the execution of method m.
These values are computed during the translation process.
Security requirements and program structure Security level of ﬁelds can be
stored in ghost ﬁelds in the corresponding class. For each class ﬁeld f (both static
and instance) we deﬁne:
public f ina l ghost S gft_f = ft( f ) ;
this enables access to the security levels of f. The domain of Γ, excAnalysis, nbLocs,
nbArgs is the set of methods names. They are stored in ghost ﬁelds of the class
where the given method name appears highest in the class hierarchy. The other
data are stored as local ghost variables of the actual methods.
In the deﬁnitions below, we use a ﬁxed correspondence between the exception
types and the natural numbers 0, . . . ,maxEx − 1. For each method m (both static
and instance) with the identiﬁer N(m), we deﬁne a set of ghost variables. These
variables will be used as constants; they will never be changed. The initial values of
all the ghost variables we use here are deﬁned to correspond directly to the values
of real values/functions.
public stat ic f ina l ghost int gnbArgs_N(m) = nbArgs(N(m)) ;
public stat ic f ina l ghost int gnbLocs_N(m) = nbLocs(N(m)) ;
public stat ic f ina l ghost boolean [maxEx ] gexcAnalysis_N(m) =
{ e0, . . . , emaxEx−1 } ;
public stat ic f ina l ghost S0
[maxS ] [ gnbLocs_N(m)+3+maxEx ] gsgn_N(m) =
{ { s0,0, . . . , s0,gnbLocs_N(m)+3+maxEx−1 } , . . .
{ smaxS−1,0, . . . , smaxS−1,gnbLocs_N(m)+3+maxEx−1 } } ;
The last two deﬁnitions make use of additional values deﬁned below. The informa-
tion contained in gexcAnalysis_N(m) is deﬁned with the use of:
ei =
(
true when excAnalysis(N(m)) says that the exception i is thrown in m,
false otherwise.
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The security signature Γm[i] = kp
kh→ kr allows us to give the values for si,j :
si,j =
8><
>:
kp(j) j < |kp |,
kh j = |kp |,
kr (j − |kp | − 1) j > |kp |.
This deﬁnition allows us to explain the meaning of gsgn[i][j] in the following way.
For a given security level i, gsgn[i][0] is the security level of the object that calls the
method m, gsgn[k][1 . . . gnbLocs_N(m)] are security levels of parameters and local
variables (note that nbLocs(N(m)) = |kp|−1), the value gsgn[k][gnbLocs_N(m)+1]
is the level of heap operations, the value gsgn[k][gnbLocs_N(m) + 2] is the level of
a normal return value and
gsgn[k][gnbLocs_N(m) + 3 . . . gnbLocs_N(m) + 3 + maxEx− 1]
are the security levels in which corresponding exceptions might be propagated (note
that maxEx ≥ |kr| − 1).
We deﬁne also local ghost variables associated with the method m:
ghost boolean [ lm ] [maxEx ] g c l a s sAna l y s i s =
{ { c0,0, . . . , c0,maxEx−1 } , . . . , { clm−1,0, . . . , clm−1,maxEx−1 } } ;
where
ci,j =
(
true when classAnalysis(i) says that the exception j can be thrown in m at i,
false otherwise.
ghost boolean [ lm ] [maxEx + 1 ] [ lm ] g r eg ion = {
{ { r0,0,0, . . . , r0,0,lm−1 } , . . . , { r0,maxEx,0, . . . , r0,maxEx,lm−1 } } , . . . ,
{ { rlm−1,0,0, . . . , rlm−1,0,lm−1 } , . . . , { rlm−1,maxEx,0, . . . , rlm−1,maxEx,lm−1 } }
} ;
where
ri,j,k =
8><
>:
true when k ∈ regionm(i, e) and the exception corresponding to e is j,
true when k ∈ regionm(i, ∅) and j = maxEx,
false otherwise.
Note that we use the index maxEx on the second coordinate to encode the region
information for the normal execution.
ghost int [ lm ] [maxEx ] gHandler =
{ { h0,0, . . . , h0,maxEx−1 } , . . . , { hlm−1,0, . . . , hlm−1,maxEx−1 } } ;
where hi,j = Handlerm(i, e) with e corresponding to the exception number j.
Type system data As noted below Def. 2.1, we may assume that se and st are
indexed with security levels from S. We use the notation sei and sti for i ∈ S to
refer to the elements of the indexed families.
ghost S [maxS ] [ lm ] gse =
{ { v0,0, . . . , v0,lm−1 } , . . . , { vmaxS−1,0, . . . , vmaxS−1,lm−1 } } ;
where vi,j = sei(j).
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ghost S0 [maxS ] [ lm ] [maxStack ] g s t = {
{ { t0,0,0, . . . , t0,0,maxStack−1 } , . . . , { t0,lm−1,0, . . . , t0,lm−1,maxStack−1 } } ,
. . . ,
{ { tmaxS−1,0,0, . . . , tmaxS−1,0,maxStack−1 } , . . . ,
{ tmaxS−1,lm−1,0, . . . , tmaxS−1,lm−1,maxStack−1 } }
} ;
where ti,j,k = n whenever (k + 1)-st element of the sequence sti(j) is n. Note that
the function sti gives security levels for the stack positions so that the length of
each sti(j) is less that the maximal stack length maxStack. We also assume that for
each i, j the elements of gst[i][0][j] are zero which corresponds to the fact that the
operand stack at the beginning of a method is empty.
Translating the rules Once we have all the annotations above, we may encode
the typability property from Def. 2.1. We do it for each method m separately and
we decide to use the local annotation table Qm (as in [12, Chapter 3]).
Qm is a ﬁnite partial map which for a program label i in m gives an assertion
Qi(s0, s). If the point i in m is annotated with Qm then Qi(s0, s) is supposed to hold
in every state s at i during any execution of m with the initial state s0 satisfying
Rm(s0) (i.e. the precondition of the method). Intuitively, Qi(s0, s) provides the
content of the assert statement right before the instruction with the label i.
Let us describe how to extend a given speciﬁcation Qm so that it ensures the
non-interference property. According to Def. 2.1, we need to state that for every
security signature of the method (recall that for each security level s there is a
separate security signature ΓN(m)[s] applicable in the situation when the object on
which m is called has the security level s), every label i, every exception e, and every
j, such that i →e j (or i →e ) some properties hold. For every i these properties
are expressed by formulae N(i)(s). We deﬁne QNIm, the local annotation table
extended with the non-interference checking, as
QNIm(i) = λc0 ∈ State λc ∈ State.
Qi(c0, c) && N(i)(1) && . . . && N(i)(maxS).
(1)
This formula expresses a new assert before the instruction at i which states that the
old assert must hold together with all the security guarding formulae which ensure
(together with all the formulae for other instructions) that the security signatures
of m are obeyed.
The security guarding formulae N(i)(s) have similar form; it is
(\forall int e, j; 0 ≤ e && e ≤ maxEx && 0 ≤ j && j < lm;
(i →e j ==> (Reginst(i),s1 (p1) || . . . || Reginst(i),sk (pk))) &&
(i →e ==> (Reginst(i),sk+1 (p1) || . . . || Reginst(i),sk′ (pk′)))) 9
(2)
where inst(i) is the instruction at the label i in the method body m. Note also
that i →e j (as well as i →e) is static information which can be deﬁned directly as
9 We add this subformula only in case the instruction may throw an exception.
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a subformula. For example, in the most typical case when the control ﬂow moves
to the next instruction, the formula is of the form j == i + 1 && e == maxEx 10 .
Here, the condition that maxEx equals e enforces that we consider a normal step. In
the case when the method has an exception handler of e0 at the point j′ we deﬁne
i →e j to be j == j′ && e == e0. As the ifeq j0 has two successors, but one
rule handles the instruction in the type system, the premise of the implication is
(j == i + 1 || j == j0) && e == maxEx in this case.
Every Reginst(i),si (pi) for i = 1, . . . , k or for i = k + 1, . . . , k
′ corresponds to one
of possibly applicable typing rules for instruction inst(i) in case i →e j (or i →e).
The type system considers an instruction to be correct when at least one of the rules
can be successfully satisﬁed. Therefore, the formulae Reginst(i),si are combined as an
alternative. Let us point out that the vectors pi are parameters of the instruction
inst. For instance, there is one rule for ifeq and Regifeq,s1 (j), corresponding to
ifeq j, equals to
(\forall int j′; 0 ≤ j′ && j′ < lm;
gregion[i][maxEx][j′] ==> gst[s][i][cntr] ≤ gse[s][j′]) &&
(\forall int p; 0 ≤ p && p < cntr;
gst[s][i][p] unionsq gst[s][i][cntr] ≤ gst[s][j][p]) &&
(\forall int p; cntr ≤ p && p ≤ maxStack;
gst[s][j][p] = 0)
(3)
We can now relate the formula to the rule in Figure 1. First, observe, that the index
cntr is a counter of the operand stack; hence gst[s][i][cntr] points to the top of the
stack and it corresponds to k from the rule. The ﬁrst precondition of the rule in
Figure 1 holds as the formula is generated only for ifeq instruction. The formula
above consists of three ∀ subformulae. The ﬁrst subformula expresses the condition
∀j′ ∈ region(i, ∅), k ≤ se(j′) from the precondition in the rule in Figure 1. Recall
that maxEx value in second parameter of gregion means a normal (non-exceptional)
behaviour. The second and the third subformulae state that liftk(st)  st(j), where
st is st(i) without its top element; in particular, the last formula checks that st(j)
is one element shorter than st(i) and that the unused part of the stack contains the
default value 0.
4 Proof of non-interference
The following theorem relates typability and the fact that the program veriﬁes cor-
rectly in the bytecode logic. It says that whenever a program with annotations
proposed in Sect. 3 successfully veriﬁes it also successfully typechecks. This prop-
erty and the main theorem of [4] (see Sect.6) imply the non-interference.
10Note that the addition can be performed ‘on-the-ﬂy’ in the course of the translation and therefore is not
a part of the formula syntax.
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Please recall that like [4], we assume that functions classAnalysis, excAnalysis,
nbLocs, nbArgs, Handler are correct.
Theorem 4.1 (typechecking and veriﬁability) Let P be a Java bytecode program,
(kobs, ft,Γ) a desired security policy, and cdr a control dependence regions structure
satisfying SOAP. Let TR be the translation deﬁned in Sect. 3 that adds base logic
annotations to P . For every security environment family {sei : PP → S}i∈S and a
family of functions {sti : PP → S∗}i∈S such that sti(0) = ε for all i,
⇒ if the annotated program TR(P, kobs, ft,Γ, cdr, se, st) veriﬁes correctly then P with
the policy (kobs, ft,Γ) and cdr is typable,
⇐ if the program P with the policy (kobs, ft,Γ) and cdr is typable with se, st, and
all Qi(c0, c) in QNIm in (1) on page 10 are true then the annotated program
TR(P, kobs, ft,Γ, cdr, se, st) veriﬁes correctly.
Proof We present here a sketch of the proof only.
(⇒) Suppose that the annotated program TR(P, kobs, ft,Γ, cdr, se, st) veriﬁes cor-
rectly. We want to show that P is typable, i.e. that every method m in P is typable
with respect to every signature in PoliciesΓ(m). We need to verify that the condition
in Def. 2.1 is fulﬁlled. Let sgn be a signature corresponding to security level s. We
take se and st as above. sts(0) = ε is guaranteed by the way gst is initialised. Since
P veriﬁes correctly the formula N(i)(s) holds for every i. The conditions (1)–(2)
from Def. 2.1 are guaranteed by the fact that all the typing rules are faithfully mod-
elled in the logic. Let us see it for inst(i) = ifeq j. In other cases the proof is
similar.
ifeq As the instruction at i is ifeq j0 we must only ensure condition (1) of Def. 2.1.
In case of the ifeq instruction, the body of the formula N(i)(s) is (i →e j0 ==>
(Regifeq,s(j0))). This formula ensures that in case j = j0 or j = i+1 the formula
Regifeq,s(j0) holds. This ensures that the check of the premises of the rule from
Figure 1 takes place indeed for the instruction ifeq. Then, as the ﬁrst \forall
subformula of Regifeq,s(j0) holds, we obtain ∀j′ ∈ region(i, ∅), k ≤ se(j′) as k
is identiﬁed with gst[s][i][cntr]. The second and the third \forall subformula of
Regifeq,s(j0) ensure that liftk(st)  st(j) (where j = i + 1 or j0).
(⇐) Suppose that the program P with the policy (kobs, ft,Γ) and cdr is typable
with se and st. We have to ensure that each QNIm(i), for i being a label in the method
m, holds. As Qi(c0, c) is true, it is enough to check that each N(i)(j) holds for j ∈ S.
Each of the N(i)(s) has similar structure presented in (2). It is enough to show that
one of the corresponding Reginst(i),sl (pl) holds in case i →e j (or in case i →e).
As the method is typable, we know that Γ, ft, regionm, se, sgn, i 
e st(i) =⇒ s
(or Γ, ft, regionm, se, sgn, i 
e st(i) =⇒) can be inferred. This is done with one of
the rules, say l-th. Now, we have to make sure that the corresponding translation
formula Reginst(i),sl (pl) holds. We show this in case inst(i) is ifeq j.
• the ﬁrst subformula of (3) holds as the typing rule guarantees that the property
∀j′ ∈ region(i, ∅), k ≤ se(j′) holds,
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• the second subformula of (3) holds as the typability requires that liftk(st)  st(j),
where st is st(i) without its top element,
• the third subformula of (3) holds as the st(j) is not determined for indices greater
than the top of the operand stack.
This ﬁnishes the proof in this case. The cases of other instructions are similar. 
4.1 Proof of stability
Theorem 4.3 below states that we can safely extend the speciﬁcations so that the non-
interference property is preserved. More precisely, it allows to mix the speciﬁcations
that result from our translation with speciﬁcations that come from other sources
(e.g. are written by hand).
Deﬁnition 4.2 (speciﬁcations in conﬂict) We say that speciﬁcations are in conﬂict
with the translation TR whenever any element of the ghost arrays or variables deﬁned
in Sect. 3 is set.
Theorem 4.3 (stability) Let P ′ be a speciﬁcational extension of TR(P, kobs, ft,Γ,
cdr, se, st) that does not conﬂict with TR(P, kobs, ft,Γ, cdr, se, st). If P ′ veriﬁes cor-
rectly then P satisﬁes the non-interference property.
Proof We present here a sketch of the proof only. When the speciﬁcation extension
does not conﬂict with the translation TR(P, kobs, ft,Γ, cdr, se, st) then the values of
all the variables used in the translation are the same. In this light, the logical values
of the formulae are the same as in case there are no additional speciﬁcations. Hence
we obtain the non-interference for P . 
5 Discussion of the solution
Declassiﬁcation Our translation modiﬁes the local assertion table Qm so that
each typing rule is checked right before the instruction instance it concerns. Note
that the logic, as presented in Sect. 2, allows to change the state of the ghost
variables by means of the local instruction table Insm. This enables an easy method
to declassify information by means of the assignment to a ghost variable. Usually,
the declassiﬁcation should occur when a value on a high security level on the stack
at a program point i should be stored in a low level ﬁeld. The current rules prevent
this, but they exploit the information stored in entries of gsgn and gst arrays that
correspond to i. We can exploit a set instruction in Insm(i) to change gsgn and
gst right before the instruction that requires the declassiﬁcation and revert it back
right before the next one. In this way we obtain a clear declassiﬁcation management
mechanism—declassiﬁcation is present when the set instructions manipulate the
mentioned above arrays.
In fact, the presented method can also be applied to many other type systems
which are information ﬂow sensitive— the ﬂow of the information is simply traced by
the ghost variables. In essence, the practice of using the ghost variables in programs
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speciﬁed in JML is in many cases such that they serve as a method to provide an
ad hoc information ﬂow typing system.
Finite range of levels The original order used in the information ﬂow type
system has not been restricted to be ﬁnite. Our translation relies crucially on the
fact that the order is ﬁnite. In practice, however, it is very diﬃcult to check the non-
interference in case of essentially inﬁnite policies— in particular such policies should
be eﬀectively enumerable and thus the checking that a policy is fulﬁlled becomes
rather an algorithm veriﬁcation task than static checking.
Design choices The primary goal of the design choices we took here was to ﬁnd
a way to express a system which ensures the non-interference property in terms of
the BML formulae. The main challenge here was to connect the ﬂow of the data
with the ﬁrst order formulae available in the language. We decided to simulate in
ghost variables the operation of the type checking.
Another possibility would be to use ghost variables to simulate an alternative
operation of the program in a ﬂavour similar to the approaches [3,6,13]. However,
the operation on the variables would use the control ﬂow of the original program
and it is not clear if it is possible to express the non-interference in this way.
The formulae we generate in our approach fall easily within the class of formulae
with three predicates ≤, < and = and addition. This kind of arithmetic is decidable
according to the classical result by Presburger (see e.g. [9]). This class is of course
more powerful and the formulae could take up, roughly, the form of ∃se, st∀ . . . where
se is the security environment and st is the abstract stack. In this way, we would
not need to rely on some external source to supply the arrays and the decision
procedure for the ﬁrst-order logic would infer the typing for the program. However,
one cannot quantify in BML so that the quantiﬁcation ranges over several diﬀerent
assert formulae. Therefore, this approach is not available directly.
This obstacle could be overcome with the help of the observation that the satis-
ﬁability of the formulae does not depend on the values of the source code variables
and the control ﬂow of the programme. This lets us to store the conjunction of
all the formulae in the method precondition Rm. That, however, would make the
implementation of the declassiﬁcation more involved. In this framework, the declas-
siﬁcation must be implemented by a modiﬁcation of the formulae themselves instead
of the modiﬁcation of the data they operate on.
Future work Currently, it is rather diﬃcult to present a single succinct example
of how the translation works as the result of the translation is rather complicated.
At the momenta tool to transform the inferences in the information ﬂow type system
to BML using the translation is under the development.
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